Indifferents as an interface between Contra and Pro by Malarz, Krzysztof & Kulakowski, Krzysztof
ar
X
iv
:0
90
8.
33
87
v1
  [
ph
ys
ics
.so
c-p
h]
  2
4 A
ug
 20
09 Indifferents as an interface between Contra
and Pro∗
Krzysztof Malarz †and Krzysztof Ku lakowski ‡
AGH University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Physics and Applied
Computer Science, al. Mickiewicza 30, PL-30059 Krako´w, Poland
Abstract
In most sociophysical simulations on public opinion, only two opinions are allowed:
Pro and Contra. However, in all political elections many people do not vote. Here
we analyse two models of dynamics of public opinion, taking into account Indifferent
voters: i) the Sznajd model with symmetry Pro-Contra, ii) the outflow one move
voter model, where Contra’s are converted to Indifferent by their Pro neighbours.
Our results on the Sznajd model are in an overall agreement with the results of the
mean field approach and with those known from the initial model formulation. The
simulation on the voter model shows that an amount of Contra’s who remain after
convertion depends on the network topology.
PACS(2008) numbers: 89.65.-s, 87.23.Ge, 89.65.Ef, 89.75.-k, 89.75.Fb
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1 Introduction
Attempts of statistical physicists to deal with sociological problems is an occur-
rence relatively new, but the question on the specific character of social sciences
lasts for the whole history of modern sociology [1]. It seems that the gap be-
tween sociophysics and mathematical sociology is more narrow than the one
between empiricistic and hermeneutical sociologies. From this point of view,
sociophysics can be seen as an overlap of physics and sociology. Mathematical
modeling of public opinion, which are of interest here, covers quite a large part
of this area. A recent review can be found in Ref. [2].
As it is known, numerous statistical data on opinions include simple Don’t
know as a third possible answer [3]. Also, indifferents are the target of most
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electoral campaigns. This means that once the mere existence of this third op-
tion is disregarded, it is hard to understand the time dynamics of public opinion
on any issue. On the other hand, it seems that once two options are symmetri-
cal, an intermediate option is necessary to give a complete picture. This rough
notion on symmetry is based on two examples. The case of election with two
candidates is symmetrical and the indifferent option is natural. The case of sup-
port for an ecological protest is not symmetrical, because the indifferent option
means ‘no support’.
Motivation of our work comes from the fact that in the current models of
public opinion, neutral or indifferent opinions are usually neglected. Opinions
either vary continuously between Pro (P) and Contra (C), or — in discrete ver-
sion — they are limited to these two cases, P or C. The models of Hegselmann–
Krauze [4] and of Deffuant-Weisbuch [5] belong to the first cathegory, while
the Sznajd model [6–17] falls into the second one, with [17] as an exception.
In some papers, third option is considered as third political party [18] or third
language [19], or three states are completely different in their nature [20]. The
option of the symmetry Pro-Contra with the neutral state as intermediate one
is considered rather rarely. We can refer to the text of Yang et al. [21], where
the set of states of a network node includes 0 as the third option apart from
±1. In this paper, the time dynamics of opinions is ruled by the same law as
interacting spins in the presence of magnetic field. Further, in papers by He et
al. [22] and by Dall’Asta and Galla [23] the voter model with the third state
has been simulated on two-dimensional lattices.
We are going to consider this third option of Indifferent (I), i.e. neutral state
in two models of public opinion on random networks. The first application is
the Sznajd model with the symmetry Pro-Contra preserved. The second appli-
cation is the outflow voter model, where this symmetry is broken. The purpose
of the latter is to refer to the sociological concept of the spiral of silence [24].
The idea of spiral of silence means that there is a positive feedback between
the social acceptance of a given opinion and the willingness of its adherents
to state it in open way. Then, the minority opinion gets less and less support
and finally nobody admits to it. Theory of spiral of silence was formulated by
Elisabeth Noelle–Neumann in her search for origins of the weakness of the Anti-
Nazi opposition in Germany. This historical case is of extremal importance,
but less famous examples are more frequent. In 2007, an information in Polish
TV about minister Kaczmarek influenced the poll outcome on support for two
main parties, because adherents of the Civic Platform preferred to answer Don’t
know after this embarrassing transmission [25]. This variation, clearly exceeding
statistical errors, vanished after a few days.
The simulation is performed for the Erdo˝s–Re´nyi network with various mean
nodes degrees 〈k〉 and, occasionally, for the growing scale-free and exponential
trees. In two subsequent sections we explain the formulation and show the
results of the symmetric and antisymmetric cases, respectively. Last section is
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devoted to discussion.
2 The Sznajd model
In its original formulation [6], the Sznajd model postulated two states, say P
and C (Pro and Contra). The rule of time evolution was as follows. A pair
of neighboring nodes, randomly selected, was checked if the nodes were in the
same states. If this was the case, this state (P or C) was assigned also to all
neighbours of each node of the pair. The basic result was that after a sufficiently
long time, the whole system fell into one of the two states, P or C.
Our formulation which includes zero state (Don’t know) and preserves sym-
metry P-C is defined as follows. A pair of neighboring nodes (i and j), if they
are in the same state P (Si = Sj = +1) or C (Si = Sj = −1), share this state
with their neighbours n. If the paired nodes are in opposite states (P-C or C-P),
all neighbours of these nodes become neutral (state S = 0). If any of two nodes
is in the neutral state (Si = 0 or Sj = 0), nothing changes:
Sn(t+ 1) =


Si(t) = Sj(t) if Si(t)Sj(t) = 1,
0 if Si(t)Sj(t) = −1,
Sn(t) if Si(t)Sj(t) = 0.
(1)
Although this fomulation seems to be less restrictive than the original one,
our numerical results indicate that the result is basically the same. In all in-
vestigated cases, the final state of the network is either all-P (
∑
i Si = +N) or
all-C (
∑
i Si = −N) for the whole network. Examples of the time dependence
of the amount of P and C are shown in Fig. 1 for different initial states, i.e. for
various values of 0 < δ < 1/2 parameter. Initially, a fraction δ of nodes stay in
state P (Si = +1) and C (Si = −1) while (1− 2δ)N actors is neutral (Si = 0).
This result can be compared with the mean-field calculation, where all local
configurations of the network are approximated by an assumption of perfect
mixing. In this case, the time dependence of the concentration of Pro (x(t))
and Contra (y(t)) can be written as
x˙ = x2(1− x)− xy2 − αx2y, (2a)
y˙ = y2(1− y)− yx2 − αy2x, (2b)
and the concentration of nodes in the neutral state I is z = 1−x−y. Equations
(2) preserves the P-C symmetry. On the right-hand-side of Eq. (2a), the first
term describes the process where two nodes in state P (x2) convert a node in
the ‘non-P’ state (1−x) to the P state. Next term is responsible to a conversion
of P (x) into non-P by two C (y2). The last term is due to the conversion of P
(x) to I by a P-C pair (xy). We give in parenthesis terms which the appropriate
rates are proportional to. In principle, the rate of the last process in not nec-
essarily equal to the others two. To mark the possible difference of these rates,
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Fig. 1: Time evolution of the densities ρ of P, C and I for various initial concen-
tration δ of P and C. N = 104, 〈k〉 = 10.
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we introduce a constant α.
According to the known procedure [26], we find the fixed points (x∗, y∗) and
determine their stability; only stable fixed points are meaningful. The stability
condition is that both eigenvalues of the Jacobian, calculated at a given fixed
point, are negative. Here we get four fixed points. First one is (0, 0) and its
stability is marginal, as both eigenvalues are equal to zero. However, this fixed
point is not interesting for us, as it corresponds to neutral agents at all nodes
of the system. There are also two fixed points (0, 1) and (1, 0) with eigenvalues
(−1,−1) for any value of α; these fixed points are always stable. The last fixed
point is x∗ = y∗ = β, where β = 1/(2 + α), and its eigenvalues are ±β; this is
unstable. As we see, in this case the mean-field solution agrees with the results
of the numerical calculations.
3 The voter model
On the contrary to the standard formulation of the voter model [2,27], here we
adopt the outflow version of the voter model, where nodes influence the state
of all their neighbours. This difference makes sense in random networks, where
neighboring nodes differ in their degrees [28]. The outflow behaviour, in the
spirit of the Sznajd model, is motivated by the analogy with the effect of spiral
of silence. Namely, we imagine that one of two political parties (Pro) gets the
power and bans the other party (Contra). Then, each member of Pro denounces
his/her neighbours who belonged to Contra, converting them by force to the
neutral state. Suppose that the initial state concentration is again δ, 1 − 2δ,
δ for P, I (Indifferents) and C, respectively. How the final amount of Contras
depend on δ? In other words, how large the opposition, now illegal, can be?
The simulation — a strong variant of the spiral of silence — is designed as
to fit this construction. At the initial state, opinions are assigned randomly to
the nodes with probabilities δ, 1− 2δ, δ for P, I and C, respectively. In one step
of simulation, all C which have P as neighbours are converted to I. In Fig. 2 we
show the proportion ϕ of the final amount of C to the initial one, as dependent
on δ. The results can be fitted with the curve
ϕ = 10−γδ〈k〉, (3)
where γ ≈ 0.4. The curve obtained for 〈k〉 = 2 coincides with the results ob-
tained for the preferentail and randomly growing tree, where 〈k〉 is also two.
This suggests, that the network topology could be of minor importance.
In these calculations, the agents moves are performed only once. Therefore,
there is no direct path from the numerical to continuous dynamics. Still for
the completeness we refer to the mean field population dynamics, which can be
written as
x˙ = x(z − αy) (4a)
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Fig. 2: Quotient ϕ of final/initial number of C for various system sizes N . Ini-
tially, the fractions of P and C among N agents is equal to δ. The mean
nodes degree is 〈k〉 = 20. The results are averaged over Nrun = 5000, 50
and 5 networks realizations for N = 100, 103 and 104, respectively.
y˙ = y(z − αx) (4b)
and, as before, z = 1− x− y. These equations are constructed with the follow-
ing processes in mind: PI → PP , CI → CC, PC → II. The rate of two first
processes is chosen to be α. As before, we get x = 1 or y = 1 as the only stable
points. It is worthwhile to note that this time evolution is slightly different from
the Krapivsky formulation of the catalytic processes [29], as there atoms P and
C arise spontaneously. In the latter formulation we should write x˙ = z − αxy,
y˙ = z−αxy and z = 1−x− y. As we see, x− y is a constant of motion. At the
only solution P and C coexist, on the contrary to the ‘sociological’ formulation
in Eqs. (4).
Next, the numerical simulation is repeated in some milder variant, where the
action of P against C depends on their degrees. Namely, P is allowed to convert
C into I only if P has more neighbours than C. This calculation is motivated by
the interpretation of the degree in social networks as an index of prestige [30].
Then, in this mild scenario only more connected agent can influence the opinion
of others. As we see, two meanings of the term ‘connected’, the topological one
and the social one harmonize. The results of this version of simulation shown
in Fig. 3 indicate that indeed, the ratio ϕ decreases with δ clearly slower, than
exponentially.
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Fig. 3: C’s are neutralized to I’s only when at least one of its P’s neighbours is
‘stronger’ (stars and squares). For comparizon the results when each P
in C’s neigbhbourhood is able to neutralize it are included as well (pluses
and crosses).
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Fig. 4: (a) Ps without contact with other Ps are eliminated. (b) Only those Ps
are eliminated which have at least one neighbour C
The role of degree can be investigated yet in another variant of calculation.
Let us suppose that just before the opinion C is banned, C are able to convert
to I all P who have no links to other P’s. This modification is applied to the
strong variant of the spiral of silence. The motivation of this variant comes from
the question, if it is desirable for the opposition C — just about to be banned
— to neutralize those P who are isolated, by force if necessary. We are glad to
announce that this method seems not to be fruitful. Two curves in Fig. 4 —
with and without this extra neutralization — almost coincide. Small differences
appear only in the range of small values of δ, where the consequences of the
whole ban are less severe.
In the last variant of our simulation the conversion is not from C to I, but
from I to P, with two additional conditions. First is that a neutral node I is
converted only if it has more neighbours in the state P than in the state C. Sec-
ond limitation is that those converted do not convert further. This calculation
is an attempt to refer to the asymmetric scenario, when the ruling opinion is
imposed forcefully to those who are neutral or indifferent. History of Central
Europe in 1944-49 brings examples, where the percentages of supporters of new
power were quite large. In Fig. 5 we show the rate φ of those converted to
the initial amount of adherents of P. The obtained data can be rougly fitted as
ψ ∝ δ−ρ with ρ ≈ 1.14. This parameterization reveals, that the smaller is the
amount of initial Pro’s, the more surprising can be the majority collected in the
above mentioned way.
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Fig. 5: All undecided I are forced to vote for P, if they have more neighbors P
than C. ψ ∝ δ−1.14 for average node degree 〈k〉 = 20.
4 Discussion
We presented a set of simulations motivated by various social and/or historical
contexts. The new element of this work is the possibility of the indifferent state
in the set of opinions. As we argued in the Introduction, this modification of
the existing models of public opinion is justified by options which are allowed in
polls. This link — from real data to the model — evades at least some aspects
of the discussion on the relation between sociological phenomena and their mea-
surements [31].
Our results on the Sznajd model are in an overall agreement with the re-
sults of the mean field approach and with those known from the initial model
formulation [6]. The mechanism of the opinion propagation by creating its new
supporters, who propagate it further, is not influenced by the amount of neutral
nodes.
In the one move voter model neutral nodes can form an environment where
the opponents to the option in power can be preserved at least to some extent.
Here, the comparison of the simulation results with those of the mean field ap-
proach indicates that the results are sensitive to the network topology. Networks
are defined without space; they have no boundaries but they have peripheries.
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In the one move voter model the converted nodes do not propagate the ruling
opinion. Agents being Contra can then be preserved in the network peripheries,
at the low connected nodes.
To conclude, the third indifferent option between the dichotomy ‘Pro-Contra’
is an ingredient which shifts mathematical models closer to the results of so-
ciological polls. With this modification, the spectrum of applications of the
models gets wider. In our opinion, conversions from Pro to Contra are rather
rare. When modeling, more attention should be payed to the boundary between
Pro and Indifferent and the one between Indifferent and Contra. Our results
indicate, that each of these boundaries is governed by its own dynamics.
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